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Iran’s views presented at 5+1 talks
During nuclear talks with the 5+1 group (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) in Moscow on June 18 and 19, Iranian negotiators provided a detailed explanation of Tehran’s views, including a proposal for holding high-level negotiations every three months.
Iranian negotiators also elaborated on their views during an expert meeting with world powers, which was held in Istanbul on July 3.
Some facts regarding Iran’s nuclear talks with 5+1
3 July 2012
In the Name of ALLAH, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful
A framework for comprehensive and targeted dialogue
for long term cooperation among 7 countries
A. Guiding Principles
Parties agree and assert on,
1. good will,
2. the spirit of cooperation,
3. mutual respect,
4. avoiding measures which violate good will, spirit of cooperation and mutual respect,
5. giving priority to the issues of mutual interest,
6. considering NPT as the cornerstone of talks,
7. commitment to the rights and obligations specified in the NPT, and
8. avoiding preconditions and agree to continue their talks in a new process which is
2. long term,
4. mutually agreed,
6. of tangible measures,
7. on the basis of step by step approach, and
8. Based on reciprocity.
1. To normalize Iran’s nuclear file in the UN Security Council and in the Board of Governors by total termination of the UNSC, unilateral, and multilateral sanctions against Iran.
2. To assure and guarantee the Islamic Republic of Iran of practically enjoying all its nuclear rights within the framework of the NPT and regulations of the IAEA, in exchange for implementing its safeguard obligations.
3. To achieve a sustainable nuclear cooperation for transferring advanced technologies.
4. To conclude a comprehensive agreement on collective commitments in the areas of economic, political, security and international cooperation.
D: Structure of the Process
• Meeting(s) between Dr. Saeed Jalili and Lady Ashton and the representatives of other 6 countries: every 3 months.
• Expert Meeting(s) of the 7 countries chaired by deputies of Dr. Jalili and Lady Ashton: prior to each main meeting.
• Combination of a set of nuclear and non-nuclear issues based on priorities suggested by the deputies meetings.
3. Agenda for the Moscow Meeting: the Islamic Republic of Iran’s proposals and
5+1 proposal which raised during Baghdad meeting.
E. Reciprocal Steps
To materialize the above mentioned objectives, and in order to:
First, legally and technically pave the way for guaranteeing the success of the talks in a short period of time in a way that it respects the legitimate and legal rights and obligations;
Second, define and agree on reciprocal steps in a way that it clearly sets the ultimate outcome of the process of the talks (namely, normalization of Iran’s nuclear file in the UN Security Council and in the Board of Governors along with cancellation of all UNSC and other types of sanctions); and
Third, facilitate and accelerate the definition of “confidence building reciprocal steps” and “desirable options for cooperation” in nuclear and non — nuclear areas;
Parties will commit themselves;
1. to define and implement the confidence building reciprocal steps in a “simultaneous”, “equipollent” and “balanced” manner, and
2. to obligate to the rights and obligations envisaged in the NPT.
Therefore, no agreement shall and can undermine NPT’s rights and obligation, or interpreted in a way that it either restricts or spoils them.
a. Nuclear Issues
Step One: Guidelines
Commencement of cooperation and reciprocal steps requires an appropriate context and a clear vision of the process. Within such context, attestation of parties to each other side’s demand indicates the required commitment to conclude the process of talks.
• The Islamic Republic of Iran emphasizes once again on its commitments under the NPT and its opposition to nuclear weapons based on the Supreme Leader’s Fatwa against such weapons.
• 5+1 officially recognizes the nuclear rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran based on Article 4 of the NPT, particularly its enrichment activities, and will openly announce it.
Step Two: Transparency Measures
The Islamic Republic of Iran will continue its broad cooperation with the IAEA within the framework of its legal and Safeguard obligations as before. Since baseless accusations and ambiguities have been raised regarding Iran’s past nuclear activities, Iran is asked to answer such allegations beyond its legal obligations;
• The Islamic Republic of Iran will transparently cooperate with the IAEA on the issue of “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program
• 5+1 will terminate all unilateral and multilateral sanctions (out of the UNSC framework) in order to make transparency on their intentions.
Step Three: Confidence building steps
The Islamic republic of Iran’s enrichment activities providing enriched fuel needed for TRR are under the supervision of the IAEA’s inspectors and cameras continuously. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been asked for taking some additional confidence building measures in this respect, although it has no more obligations in this regard;
• The Islamic Republic of Iran will cooperate with 5+1 to provide enriched fuel needed for TRR.
• In order to build confidence on their intentions, 5+1 will terminate the sanctions and will remove Iran’s nuclear file from UNSC agenda.
Step Four: Strengthening cooperation on mutual interests
In order to enhance assurance and confidence and to fulfill parties interests, parties will agree to start and boost their cooperation on the following issues:
• The Islamic Republic of Iran’s priorities: Designing and building nuclear power plants, and research reactors.
• 5+1 priorities: light water research reactors, nuclear safety and security, nuclear fusion
Step Five: Strengthening joint cooperation
For the purpose of broadening the dimensions of trust and confidence and working on the common grounds of interest in non-nuclear areas, parties agree to start their cooperation on the following issues;
• The Islamic Republic of Iran’s priorities: Regional issues especially Syria and Bahrain
• 5+1 priorities: combating Piracy and counter narcotic activities.
Reviewing and Assessing the Proposal of 5+1
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:
A. “Stopping all activity at Fordow, including both 5% enrichment and 20% enrichment and the installation of additional centrifuges and centrifuge components”
• 5 percent enrichment activities and installing more centrifuges and their components do not correlate with 20 percent enrichment.
• In Fordo there are other activities which are not related to 20% enrichment.
B. “Transferring 20% enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA custody”
• There is no correlation between transferring 20 percent materials out of the country with 20 percent enrichment. All materials are under the “supervision” and “seal” and “unannounced inspections” of the IAEA.
• There is no correlation between transferring 20 percent materials out of the country with 20 percent enrichment as in the third country materials would be under the supervision of the IAEA, as this the case in Iran.
C. “Shutting down the Fordow facility will address concerns that the facility is intended for military use”
• This facility is not a military base and there is no reason to consider it so.
• None of the equipments and items used, especially the one used to collect enriched material, neither the design nor the system can be used to collect highly enriched materials.
• IAEA director has explicitly confirmed that all the equipment and activities in Fordo are for peaceful purposes and under the supervision of IAEA.
D. “Fordow facilities ... concerns ... since it is located on a military base”
• These facilities are not located on a military base.
• There is no limitation to international authorized access (IAEA access) to this facility.
E. “Fordow facilities ... concerns ... since it is heavily fortified”
• Protection of sensitive nuclear facilities is not only permissible but necessary
• Established international mechanisms for nuclear security highlight the need for strong protection of nuclear facilities.
• The sustained threats against nuclear facilities and enrichment activities, as well as ongoing threats against nuclear scientists, which are in contradiction to the UN charter and resolutions, necessitate more security from such facilities.
• Facing constant threats, we need a back up facility to safeguard our enrichment activities.
F. “Fordow facilities ... concerns ... since it is too small for commercial purposes”
• Fordow facility has never been constructed for commercial purposes
• The main purpose of Fordow facility is to protect it against threats, but it is also being used for 20% enrichment, R&D activities, labs, storage places, etc.
• Facing constant threats, we need a back up facility to safeguard our enrichment activities
G. “Agreement on these interrelated elements (stopping, shutting down, shipping) is necessary”
• Shutting down Fordo facility has no relation to 20%, as various activities other than producing 20 percent materials are done at Fordow.
• Transferring the materials out of the country is not related with 20 percent enrichment because all materials in Iran are under the supervision of the IAEA, sealed by the IAEA and inspectors of the agency do the unannounced inspections.
H. “5+1 will cooperate with Iran to provide fuel complexes for the Tehran Research Reactor”
• A few months before, Iran put its home- made fuel complexes inside TRR. Therefore, cooperation of 5+1 to “provide fuel complexes for TRR” is far from the actual needs and real time requirements of Iran.
I. “With provision of fuel for the TRR, there is no rationale for further production of 20% material”
• Continuation of 20 percent enrichment to supply needed fuel for TRR in the next few years,
• Calculating the amount of 20 percent materials that due to technical issues, including relevant tests, get out of the cycle,
• Supplying fuel needed for at least 4 other research reactors because of the territorial extent of Iran and the short lifetime of medical isotopes,
• Right of the Islamic Republic of Iran to sell fuel complexes to other countries
J.”The E3+3 would support IAEA Technical Cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR”
“The E3+3 could review the IAEA Technical Cooperation projects ... and make a recommendation to the IAEA Board on restarting some of them”
• Technical cooperation of the Agency with Iran for its peaceful nuclear activities is an obligation of the IAEA and one of the rights of IR. Iran as a member state of the agency and the NPT.
• IR. Iran voices its readiness to share its software and hardware services in the area of research reactor safety if other countries need and at discretion of the IAEA
J.”The E3+3 would support IAEA Technical cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR”
“The E3+3 could review the IAEA Technical cooperation projects ... and make a recommendation to the IAEA Board on restarting some of them”
• Placing technical cooperation of the Agency in the shadow of political measures is contrary to the dignity and specialized status of the IAEA.
• Under Article4:2 of the NPT, 5+1 are required for fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and information with Iran.
L. “E3+3 has put together a detailed package ... to provide medical isotopes for cancer patients in Iran”
“E3+3 ... to ensure no gap in treatment for your cancer patient”
“The United States is prepared to ... permit safety- related inspection and repair in Iran for Iranian commercial aircraft”
• Providing isotopes for patients, treating cancer patients as well as repairing and providing spare parts for commercial aircrafts are among basic human rights, and mixing them with political issues demonstrates non- constructive objectives of the other side.
• M. “The E3+3 would cooperate with Iran to provide Iran fuel elements for the Tehran Research Reactor”
• “The E3+3 would support IAEA Technical Cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR”
• “Cooperation on the early stages of acquiring a modern light water isotope producing research reactor”
• “The United States is prepared to adjust its sanctions policy ...“
• “The E3+3 could review the IAEA Technical Cooperation projects ... and make a recommendation to the IAEA Board on restarting some of them”
• Regardless of the substance of the above propositions as the reciprocal steps of 5+1, it should be said that:
• First, using general terms such as “cooperation”, “support”, “adjustment”, “review” and “recommendation” in these propositions are in contradiction with the basic goal of the very same proposal “which is creating confidence and trust in the first stage.”
• Second, the above-mentioned suggestions are not compatible with the requests such as “stopping enrichment”, “transferring of materials” and “shutting down the Fordo”.
• Third, taking into consideration the record and history of the western countries attitudes regarding Iran’s nuclear issue, it would increase and deepen the distrust and uncertainty on the Iranian side.